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Cycles of Wage Discrimination
* 
 
Using CPS data from 1979-2009 we examine how cyclical downturns and industry-specific 
demand shocks affect wage differentials between white non-Hispanic males and women, 
Hispanics and African-Americans. Women’s and Hispanics’ relative earnings are harmed by 
negative shocks, while the earnings disadvantage of African-Americans may drop with 
negative shocks. Negative shocks also appear to increase the earnings disadvantage of bad-
looking workers. A theory of job search suggests two opposite-signed mechanisms that affect 
these wage differentials. It suggests greater absolute effects among job-movers, which is 





This study considers how the disadvantages faced by women, minority groups and others 
change over the business cycle. Examining the U.S. from 1979-2009, it shows that women’s 
and Hispanics’ wages are relatively lower than white males’ wages in bad times than in good 
times; but African-Americans do relatively better in bad times. The reason for the different 
responses to unemployment may be that there are two opposite effects on these measures 
of discrimination. Employers have a greater ability to indulge their desires to discriminate 
when unemployment is higher; but in bad times indulging those desires creates a greater risk 
of bankruptcy, because the employer’s profit situation is more precarious. Examining 
differences between job-stayers and job-movers provides some support for this explanation. 
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I. Introduction and History 
For nearly 50 years the measurement of wage differentials between racial and 
ethnic groups, and between genders, has been a mainstay of empirical labor economics.  
Nearly all of the empirical work has implicitly been grounded in Becker’s (1957) taste-
based approach; and almost the entire oeuvre has either measured cross-section 
differentials or considered trends in these “discriminatory” differences. Relative to the 
attention paid to cross-section differences and trends in wage effects, remarkably little 
attention has been paid to how these differentials vary with the extent of labor-market 
tightness. The issue was mentioned only in passing in the first Handbook survey (Cain, 
1986) and was not even alluded to in the sequel Handbook survey (Altonji and Blank, 
1999). 
A few studies from the 1970s and 1980s did attempt to measure the cyclicality of 
discriminatory wage differentials (Ashenfelter, 1970; Freeman, 1973; O’Neill, 1985), 
analyzing aggregate time series of the ratio of annual earnings of disadvantaged 
compared to other workers. Measured cyclical movements in ratios of earnings per hour 
could arise from two distinct mechanisms: changes over the cycle in the characteristics of 
the workers in each group (composition effects) and changes over the cycle in pure wage 
discrimination. The authors recognized this and pointed to both mechanisms as reasons 
for expecting cyclicality in measured discriminatory wage gaps. Discussions of 
composition effects pointed to the greater “vulnerability” of women and minorities to 
cycle-related job loss, but also noted the tendency for women and minorities to be 
employed in more stable, albeit lower-wage, industries. Both O’Neill and Freeman 
concluded that composition effects led to a counter-cyclical movement in measured   2
discriminatory wage differentials. Freeman and Ashenfelter offered reasons for 
suspecting that true wage discrimination would also be counter-cyclical, with Ashenfelter 
referring to an apparently common argument of the time that the perceived cost to 
employers of discriminating was higher in tight labor markets. But neither found 
empirical evidence of cyclical movements pure wage discrimination.  
Since the mid-1990s, despite the continuing volatility of aggregate and local labor 
markets, including the recent turmoil caused by the Great Recession, almost no attention 
has been given to relationship between labor market tightness and discriminatory wage 
differentials. Numerous studies have used the CPS and other individual level data sets to 
study longer-term movements in discriminatory wage differentials, but this literature has 
been concerned with secular trends, with almost no mention made of the possible 
cyclicality of such differentials.
1  
In this study we remedy this neglect. In the next section we document the paths of 
wage differentials by gender (female/male), ethnicity (Hispanic/non-Hispanic) and race 
(black/white), using the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups 
(CPS-MORG) from 1979 through 2009.  This is a sufficiently long period to cover four 
(or five, if one considers the early 1980s recessions as distinct) aggregate cycles.  Since 
the CPS-MORG files provide individual level data with industry and geographic 
identifiers, we can measure more accurately the labor market environment facing each 
worker; and the longitudinal component of the CPS-MORG data allows us to go a long 
way toward distinguishing changes in measured wage differentials due to changes in pure 
wage discrimination from those due to composition effects.   
                                                 
1See, e.g., Blau and Kahn (2006), or Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008). Kuhn and Shen (2010) is a rare 
exception to this generalization, although in a very specific context.    3
We find that the male-female wage gap is counter-cyclical, that is, the wage 
disadvantage faced by women grows when and where unemployment is temporarily 
higher. This does not appear to be due to a composition effect, but rather to changes in 
pure wage discrimination. The same is true of the wage disadvantage faced by Hispanics. 
The measured discriminatory gap for African- Americans, on the other hand, is pro-
cyclical, but this is partly the result of composition effects. In Section III we offer 
suggestive evidence of the counter-cyclicality of still another possibly discriminatory 
wage differential, one based on looks.   
Section IV sets out a search-theoretic model of discrimination to aid in 
interpreting the evidence. We show that a standard random search model with employer 
discrimination implies a cost to employers of indulging discriminatory tastes that varies 
pro-cyclically, thus providing a formal version of the argument cited by Ashenfelter and 
others; but the model also points to other ways that discriminatory wage differentials 
might be affected by a changing unemployment to vacancy ratio.  The implication of this 
model that economic fluctuations will change discriminatory wage differentials through 
their impact on the wage changes experienced by job-changers is supported in the data.  
II. Data and Evidence—Current Population Survey, 1979-2009 
A.   Basic Estimates 
  Throughout this section we use the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing 
Rotation Groups beginning 1979, the first year for which they are available.  We proxy 
wages by reported usual weekly earnings, but we adjust weekly earnings by including a 
quadratic in usual weekly hours among the independent variables.  We create indicator   4
variables M for female, Hispanic or African-American.
2  In addition, throughout we 
adjust wages by holding constant for a wide range of CPS covariates, X, including a 
vector of indicators of educational attainment, a quadratic in potential experience, and 
indicators of marital status, metropolitan location, veteran status and private/public sector 
employment. The samples are restricted to wage and salary workers—the self-employed 
are excluded, as are members of the armed forces. 
For each year we calculate the unemployment rate U in each state and use that as 
the cyclical indicator. We thus estimate: 
Wist = α1Mist + α2Ust + α3MistUst + βXist + νs + τt + εist  ,    (1) 
where i denotes an individual, s a state and t a year, and W is the logarithm of weekly 
earnings.  The νs and τt are state and year fixed effects respectively. While we initially 
estimate (1) without either of these vectors, and then include only the state fixed effects 
or only the year fixed effects, to save space the tables shown below report results from 
regressions that include both vectors. Separate equations are estimated with M 
representing females, Hispanics and African-Americans, so that the estimate of α1 + α3U 
denotes the wage differential relative to all other workers.  The coefficients on U listed in 
the Table treat unemployment as a fraction of the labor force. 
  When we estimate (1) with the vector of state fixed effects we are implicitly 
focusing on temporary variations in the tightness of state labor markets.  This 
specification accounts for the possibility that in certain states unemployment may be 
above or below the national average in most or all years (although Marston, 1985, 
suggests not). Such long-term differences are arguably related to wage differences (e.g., 
                                                 
2For the later years, when the CPS offers a large variety of racial characteristics, we code as African-
American only those who listed that as their sole racial identification.     5
Hall, 1970, but going back to Smith, 1776) and may also be correlated, coincidentally or 
not, with interstate differences in general attitudes towards various minorities.  When we 
estimate (1) including the vector of year fixed effects, we are implicitly abstracting from 
aggregate cycles.  Adding both state and year fixed effects to the regression reduces the 
precision in our estimates of the impact of changes in unemployment on discriminatory 
wage differentials, but alleviates any bias caused by a correlation between secular 
changes in the natural rate of unemployment and secular changes in attitudes towards 
women and minorities. 
  Table 1 contains the main results of the estimated equations that include the 
“minority” indicators.  For the race/ethnicity categories we present the parameter 
estimates for the indicator in an equation estimated over the entire sample, and then 
separately for males and females in each case.  We show only the main effect of the 
indicator, the main effect of the state unemployment rate, and their interactions—the 
parameters αj—as the estimates of the β are standard.
3 
  Consider first the results for women.  With a mean state unemployment rate of 
0.0601 over this period, the wage disadvantage of women, other things equal, averages 
about 11 percent. The interaction term is significantly negative—as the unemployment 
rate increases the wage disadvantage facing women increases.  This effect does not 
depend on our inclusion of the state and year fixed effects:  The interaction term is 
negative and statistically significant even without either one or both of these.  Clearly, 
measured discrimination against females generally is counter-cyclical. 
                                                 
3Throughout the estimates are based on equations with observations weighted by the CPS sampling 
weights.    6
  Considering next the results in Columns (2)-(4) for Hispanics, we see that 
generally the wage disadvantage is around 16 percent, greater for Hispanic males, less for 
female Hispanics.  The pattern of the Hispanic wage disadvantage is weakly counter-
cyclical, because it is composed of a significantly counter-cyclical effect among Hispanic 
men, and a statistically insignificant pro-cyclical effect among Hispanic women.  Unlike 
women generally, these effects do depend upon whether the vectors of state and year 
fixed effects are included in the estimates. When these are excluded the interaction terms 
for Hispanics generally, and for Hispanic women, are positive and statistically 
significant, with most of the change resulting from the exclusion of the state fixed effects.  
Because of the concentration of Hispanics in a few, high-unemployment states, we 
believe that excluding the vector of state indicators is incorrect.    
The final three columns of Table 1 present the results for all African-Americans 
and for African-American men and women separately.  The wage disadvantage overall 
averages about 10 percent, somewhat more among men.  More important, the interaction 
terms are positive and statistically significant for the whole sample and among men and 
women separately.  The results among African-American women are unchanged whether 
we include the vector of state fixed effects, the vector of year fixed effects, or neither.  If 
these vectors are excluded, however, the interactions for the entire sample, and the 
sample of men only, remain positive but lose their statistical significance. 
  The impacts of a typical recession vary sharply across the gender/race/ethnic 
groups, with the biggest effect among women.  For them an increase of 4.7 percentage-
points in average unemployment (which occurred in the Great Recession) increases their 
wage disadvantage by nearly 5 percentage points; among Hispanics the effect is tiny—an   7
increase in their wage disadvantage of less than 1 percentage point, while among African-
Americans this severe a recession reduces their wage disadvantage by about 1.5 
percentage points.   
B.   Extensions 
  The samples include many workers who may be insulated from cyclical shocks.  
The wages of junior and less educated workers may be more responsive to changes in 
labor-market conditions than those of their seniors and of workers with greater 
educational attainment.
4  Since wages of these workers are more responsive, perhaps the 
responsiveness of the discriminatory wage differentials among them, those more likely to 
be newly hired or to face a seniority-based layoff, is greater too. To examine this 
possibility we restrict the samples to workers who have not completed a college 
education and who have five or fewer years of potential labor-market experience.  The 
results of the estimates based on these restricted samples are presented in Table 2 in the 
same format as in Table 1. 
  The results for women in Table 2 are qualitatively identical to those in Table 1.  
For this restricted sample of younger and less educated women, the female wage 
disadvantage increases with rises in unemployment.
5  The estimates of the interaction 
terms among Hispanics do, however, change compared to those for the entire sample, 
becoming more positive (a smaller wage disadvantage with rising unemployment).   
Indeed, for this inexperienced group of workers there is no evidence of any statistically 
significant cyclical variation in the wage disadvantage of Hispanics.  Among African-
                                                 
4For an insightful early discussion, see Reder (1955).  
 
5The result is unchanged when we delete the vector of state fixed effects, the vector of year fixed effects, or 
both.    8
Americans the wage disadvantage in this restricted sample varies more negatively with 
rising unemployment than in the entire sample, so that there is essentially no cyclicality 
in it. The absence of any cyclical variation among African-Americans generally is 
comprised of a statistically insignificant negative relationship among men, and a 
significant positive relationship among women. 
  The results thus far have been based on samples covering thirty-one years.  Given 
the documented changes in the labor markets for members of all three “minorities,” 
perhaps the extent of cyclical variation in their wages over this period changed too.  To 
examine this possibility we first divide the entire sample period into two parts, 1980-92 
and 1993-2009 (each thus comprising two aggregate business cycles) and re-estimate the 
equations over the entire sample and the samples of men and women. 
  The estimates over these two sub-periods are shown in Table 3.  Among women 
the results in the earlier sub-period are the same as before—apparently increasing 
discrimination as unemployment increases; but in the later sub-period the results reverse, 
with apparent discrimination falling as unemployment increases. Among Hispanics the 
estimates are consistent with those in Table 1, and perhaps even stronger, showing that 
for the entire group and among men and women separately, the wage disadvantage 
increases as unemployment increases.  Lastly, among African-Americans the estimates 
suggest a roughly similar conclusion as those for the entire sample—that the wage 
disadvantage declines when the unemployment rate rises.  
  The cyclicality of wage differentials measured in the regressions reported thus far 
could arise from both cyclicality in pure wage discrimination and from unemployment-
related changes in the unobservable characteristics of the sample of employed workers—  9
a composition effect in the unobservables. The short longitudinal structure of the CPS-
MORG, in which many households are interviewed twice at a one-year interval, allows 
us to examine the co-movement of unemployment rates and discriminatory wage 
differentials in a group of workers of constant composition, thus eliminating even these 
composition effects. This analysis thus controls for possible interactions between a wide 
range of unobservable individual characteristics with the unemployment rate.  
Table 4 presents the results of regressions in which the sample is restricted to 
observations that had positive earnings in both months 4 and 8 (one year apart) of their 
participation in the CPS and which include person fixed effects, so that state fixed effects 
are implicit in the estimation.
6 We present estimates for the entire sample period and then 
separately for the two sub-periods.  Essentially we difference (1) so that the dependent 
variable is the change in log-earnings, and the only independent variables are M, the 
change in the state unemployment rate, their interaction, and linear terms in experience 
and current and year-lagged weekly hours. 
The results for women are unambiguous—for the whole sample and the two sub-
periods the wage disadvantage of women grows when and where unemployment is 
temporarily higher, just as it did in the cross sections. Thus, the positive relationship 
between the unemployment rate and the wage disadvantage faced by women would seem 
to be the result of cyclical movements in pure wage discrimination. Table 4 even shows 
that the apparent reversal of sign of the relationship between unemployment and the 
male-female wage gap during the latter half of our sample period was due to a change in 
the impact of  unobservable, unemployment-related composition effects on the measured 
                                                 
6This arises because of the household basis of the CPS.  
   10
gap rather than a change in the cyclicality of wage discrimination.  This observation 
would seem to be consistent with Mulligan and Rubinstein’s (2008) finding that the 
nature of selection into the female labor force changed between the 1970s and the 1990s.  
The estimates also show that the relatively weak positive relationship between 
unemployment and the wage disadvantage facing Hispanics in the cross-section becomes 
considerably stronger when composition effects arising from unobservables are removed.  
Hispanic workers who keep their jobs as unemployment rises implicitly have increasingly 
more desirable unobservable characteristics than do non-Hispanic workers who keep their 
jobs. The positive co-movement of the relative wages of African-Americans and 
unemployment that we saw in Table 1 diminishes in magnitude and becomes 
insignificant when measured in this sample with unchanging unobservable composition.  
  While we have carefully accounted for labor-market-wide effects, treating states 
as labor markets, we have ignored the job-specific impacts of changes in demand.  The 
question is whether, given the state’s labor market, the impact of job-specific shocks 
mirrors that of a labor-market-wide shock. To examine this we respecify (1) as:  
Wist = α1Mist + α2Ust + α3MistUst + α4ΔHit + α5ΔHitMist + α6ΔHitUst +  
+ α7ΔHitMistUst+βXist + + νs + τt + εist ,               (2) 
where ΔHit is the percentage change in total person-hours worked in the CPS industry 
between years t-1 and t.     
We present estimates of the αj in (2) in Table 5 for equations with the seven 
specifications of the indicator M.  As before, unemployment is treated as fractional, as is 
ΔHit. The estimates are trimmed to remove industry/year observations in which the 
calculations from the CPS implied an absolute annual change in total person-hours   11
exceeding 50 percent.  This amounts to deleting 2.3 percent of the industry-year 
observations, but only 0.1 percent of the individuals in the 1980-2009 samples (as the 
extreme fluctuations in industry person-hours are due to small sample sizes in the 
particular industries).
7 
First, although not shown in the table, the estimates of ∂
2W/∂M∂U at the average 
ΔH differ only very slightly from the estimates in Table 1 (not surprisingly, given the 
lack of correlation between state unemployment rates and annual changes in economy-
wide industry hours worked).  Thus accounting for industry-specific changes in 
employment does not alter the conclusion that the female and Hispanic wage 
disadvantages rise as unemployment rises, and the African-American wage disadvantage 
falls. 
To answer whether industry-specific shocks affect gender/racial/ethnic wage 
differentials in the same way as market-wide shocks, we focus on the estimates of 
∂
2W/∂M∂ΔH at the average U, shown at the bottom of Table 5. In most cases the sign of 
this estimate is opposite that of the interaction term shown in Table 1.  Thus among 
women we observe the same negative effect on wage differentials of declines in industry 
demand that we observed for cyclical labor-market rises in unemployment in Table 1—as 
ΔH is more negative, women’s wages fall relative to men’s. Among African-Americans 
the same positive effect is observed—as ΔH drops, African-Americans’ wages rise 
relatively.   The opposite is true for Hispanics:  Unusually large drops in industry demand 
decrease the relative wages of Hispanics, just as did cyclical increases in unemployment. 
A fair conclusion is that the effects of industry-specific are the same as those of cyclical, 
market-wide shocks. 
                                                 
7We spliced the series using the overlapping industry definitions in the 2002 CPS.   12
III. Another “Discriminatory” Dimension—Looks 
  There is by now a wide array of studies demonstrating that, other things equal, 
worse-looking workers of both sexes earn less than their better-looking peers, both 
generally and within a wide array of occupations (summarized in Hamermesh, 2011, 
Chapters 3 and 4).  As another illustration of the cyclical variation in “discriminatory” 
wage differences, we can combine evidence from two studies of the earnings of attorneys 
to examine cyclicality in the pay penalty for bad looks.  In Biddle and Hamermesh (1998) 
we examined twelve cohorts of graduates from a prestigious law school whose earnings 
were observed one year, five years and fifteen years post-graduation.  The estimated 
effects of a one-standard deviation improvement in attorneys’ looks are reproduced in 
Table 6.  The cohorts of attorneys who entered the labor market for lawyers between 
1972 and 1977 faced a growing and significant beauty premium (and ugliness penalty) as 
their careers progressed.  The earnings of attorneys in the cohorts that graduated between 
1982 and 1987 were unaffected by differences in their looks, at least early in their 
careers. 
  Figure 1 reproduces Rosen’s (1992) graphical description of lifetime earnings 
forecasts facing entrants into this labor market at each year of graduation, 1967-1987.  
We can compare the earnings that could have been expected by those attorneys who 
graduated in the early to mid-1970s to those who graduated in the early to mid-1980s.  
Clearly, real and relative earnings were higher in the latter period; and Rosen (1992) 
demonstrates that this difference arose from the tighter labor market for attorneys.   
Comparing these findings to the results in Table 6 suggests that the impact of looks on 
earnings—and the “discriminatory” disadvantage in pay of bad-looking workers—was   13
smaller in the tighter legal labor market of the 1980s than in the looser legal market of the 
1970s.  The findings for this occupational labor market are similar to those for female and 
Hispanic workers, but opposite that for African-American workers. 
IV. Modeling Discrimination over the Cycle 
The previous sections have presented compelling evidence that discriminatory 
wage gaps are related to labor market tightness, a relationship that shows up even in 
analyses of co-movements of wage and unemployment over a year in samples of 
unchanging composition. In this section we outline an equilibrium search model intended 
to provide some insights into why pure wage discrimination might be related to labor 
market tightness, a model that builds on the work of Black (1995) and Rosén (2003).  It 
contains two types of workers, one of which is subject to employer discrimination in the 
labor market. The model explores the intuition that the rising ratio of job seekers to 
vacancies during a recession might give employers more scope to indulge discriminatory 
tastes, while bringing to light other ways that cyclical fluctuations affect discriminatory 
wage differentials. We present enough of the model to make clear the key mechanisms; 
an appendix available from the authors contains a complete characterization of the 
equilibrium.   
There are two types of worker, type A and type B. Type A workers are favored 
and account for a fraction λ of job seekers. Workers search randomly across vacancies 
offered by employers. Each potential vacancy is associated with a value of the 
discrimination coefficient c, which is distributed across vacancies over a range from zero 
to cmax. A vacancy’s discrimination coefficient manifests itself as a tax on the employer   14
who hires a type B worker into the vacancy, but it may influence the wage paid to a type 
A worker hired into that vacancy.  
Equations (2) and (3) express the value to a worker of type i of being unemployed 
(Ui) versus being employed in a position with discrimination coefficient c (Wi(c)).  
rUi = θzi[E(Wi(c) )– Ui] ,   i   =   A ,   B           ( 3 )  
rWi(c) =  wi(c) + s[Ui – Wi( c ) ]        ( 4 )  
In (3) r is the discount rate, θ is the rate at which workers receive job offers, zi is the 
probability that the employer will be willing to hire the worker of type i, and E(Wi(c) ) is 
the expected value, for worker type i, of being employed, where the expectation is taken 
over the distribution of c. In (4) s is an exogenous separation rate, and wi(c) the wage 
earned by a type i worker at a job with a discrimination coefficient of c.  
Equations (5) and (6) give the value to the employer of a vacancy and a filled job 
as functions of the job’s discrimination coefficient, c.  
rV(c) = -k + φy(c)[E(Ji( c )   –   V ( c ) ]         ( 5 )  
rJi(c) = x – wi(c) – ci + s[rV(c) – Ji(c)],  i = A, B          (6) 
In (5) k is the cost of keeping a vacancy open for a period, φ is the rate at which workers 
arrive at employers, and y(c) is the probability that the randomly arriving worker will be 
acceptable to the employer, which depends on the vacancy’s c value. The expectation in (5) 
is taken over the distribution of worker types.  In (6) x is the value of a worker’s product, 
assumed the same for all workers in all jobs, and ci is equal to zero if a type A worker is 
hired, and equal to the vacancy’s discrimination coefficient if a type B worker is hired.  
  Because it costs to keep a vacancy open, and there is a foregone surplus from a 
filled job, the employer offering a vacancy with a non-zero c faces a tradeoff.  Hiring a   15
type B worker has a psychic cost, c, which for some vacancies will be greater than the 
equilibrium wage discount for type B workers; but turning the worker away and waiting 
for a type A worker to apply generates a cost in terms of k and forgone x that is 
proportional to the waiting time.  
Following common practice, we assume that, when a worker meets an employer 
in the search process, the wage is determined by a Nash bargaining process, which gives 
the worker a share β of the surplus. The potential surplus for an i worker and a c vacancy 
is (Wi(c) – Ui) + (Ji(c) – V(c)).  Replacing Wi(c) and Ji(c) in this expression with (4) and 
(6) yields a wage equation for a type-i worker in a c vacancy: 
wi(c) = β(x – ci –  rV(c)) + (1 – β)rUi            ( 7 )  
Equations (5)-(7) can be used to derive two possible values for a c-vacancy. Let 
V
AB represent the value of the vacancy if the employer is willing to fill it with either type 
of worker, and V
A stand for the value of the vacancy if the employer hires only A type 
workers. Then:  
rV
AB(c) = {-k(r+s) + (1 – β)φ[x – (1 – λ)c – λrUA – (1 – λ)rUB]}/(r+s+(1 – β)φ)     (8a) 
 rV
A(c) = {-k(r+s) + (1 – β)φλ[x – rUA]}/(r+s+(1 – β)φλ)   .                (8b) 
Whether a vacancy is segregated or integrated depends on which of these values is 
higher, and that depends on the value of c. Setting (8a) equal to (8b) gives a cutoff value 
c*, such that vacancies for which c>c* will be filled only with A workers: 
c* = {[(r+s)(k+x) + (1 – β)φλ rUA]/[r+s+(1 – β)φλ]} – rUB     ( 9 )  
A higher c* means less discrimination. A higher cost of waiting (k) or a higher value of 
production (x) leads to less discrimination, since the cost of discriminating is waiting for 
the next worker to come along if a B worker is denied the job.     16
Let H(c*) be the probability that c<c*, so that zB, the probability that a vacancy 
found by a type B worker will be filled by him, is H(c*), while zA = 1. Then (3) and (4) 
and the wage equation (7) yield expressions for the value of search for each type of 
worker: 
rUA = [θβE(x – rV(c))]/(r+s+θβ)         ( 1 0 a )  
rUB = [θβE(x – c – rV(c)|c<c*)H(c*)]/(r+s+θβH(c*))  ,     (10b) 
where the expectations are over the distribution of c. These equations can be used to 
show that UA > UB, which, given the wage equation (7), implies that in equilibrium the B 
worker receives a lower wage than the A worker at any employer willing to hire both 
types.
8 Also, as V
AB is declining in c, wages for both A and B workers fall as c increases 
up to c*, at which point there is no wage for B workers and the A wage remains constant.   
The arrival rate of workers φ, which is one factor determining the cost to 
employers of discrimination, depends on the processes governing the number of 
searching workers and the number of vacancies offered. Letting the total number of 
workers equal 1, a fraction α of whom are type A, and letting the number unemployed for 
type A and type B workers be uA and uB, the change over time in the number unemployed 
can be written as duA = s(α – uA) – θuA   and  duB = s((1 – α) – uB) – θH(c*)uB . In a 
steady state unemployment is constant, so that the steady-state rates of unemployment are 
given by:  
uA =  αs/(s+θ)            ( 1 1 a )  
 uB = (1 – α)s/(s+θH(c*))  .         (11b) 
                                                 
8As in Black (1995) and Rosén (2003), the value of search (U) is lower in equilibrium among type B 
workers, because they have a longer expected search time before finding a vacancy that will fill. This 
weakens their bargaining position when they do find an employer, so they end up with a lower wage.  
   17
Group-specific unemployment rates can be found by dividing (11a) and (11b) by α and (1 
– α), respectively, leading to the unsurprising result that the unemployment rate for B 
type workers will always be higher than the unemployment rate for A type workers. Also, 
λ, the share of unemployed workers who are Type A, will always be lower than α, the 
share of type A workers in the economy. 
To endogenize the number of vacancies, assume that there are M potential 
vacancies that will become actual vacancies if their value is greater than zero. In order to 
have an equilibrium in which discriminators can survive long-run entry, we follow Black 
(1995) by assuming differences in entrepreneurial ability that are attached to potential 
employers. Entrepreneurial ability is represented by a fixed cost that is incurred if a 
vacancy is opened (and persists whether it is filled or not). We represent this cost by the 
parameter ε, assumed to be distributed uniformly across vacancies on the interval 0 to Rε, 
independent of the discrimination coefficient c, which is also assumed to be distributed 
uniformly across potential vacancies. The fixed cost parameter appears as a term 
subtracted from the value equations (7a) and (7b).  
Potential vacancies will become actual vacancies if: 
εj < rV
AB(cj, c*) if cj  <   c *          ( 1 2 )  
εj < rV
A( c*)     if cj > c* , 
where j indexes vacancies, each of which has an ε value and a c value. The value of 
vacancy equations are function of c* because the value of search Ui, which affects the 
value of a vacancy, is a function of c*. The value of a vacancy is a direct function of c 
only for employers who integrate. This means that in equilibrium, the number of 
vacancies will be:   18
                      c* 
v =M/(cmaxRε){∫ rV
AB(c,c*)dc  + (cmax – c)rV
A(c)}  .      (13) 
               
 0 
With equations for the number of vacancies and the number of unemployed 
workers we can characterize the arrival rates θ and φ. As is common in the literature, we 
assume a matching function m(uA+uB, v) that describes  the number of meetings between 
searching workers and vacancies that will occur in a period. The number is increasing in 
both vacancies and (because search is random) the total number unemployed. Adding the 
conventional assumption that the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale 
allows the rate at which a searching worker meets a vacancy to be written as:  
θ = m(uA + uB, v)/ (uA + uB) = m(1, v/(uA + uB))  ,      (14) 
while the rate at which employers see workers showing up at vacancies is:  
φ = m(uA + uB, v)/ v = m((uA + uB)/v  ,  1)    .      (15) 
In the context of this model, we represent macroeconomic fluctuations as changes 
in the value of x, the value to the firm of a workers’ output. It is possible to differentiate 
the equilibrium value of the wage gap with respect to changes in x, but this leads to a 
complex and non-transparent expression with an ambiguous sign. The model can, 
however, be used to think through the step-by-step impact of a recession on employers, 
workers, and market-level variables, thus providing some insight into the sources of this 
ambiguity and their possible correspondence to real world phenomena.   
As discussed above, one cost to discriminating is the opportunity cost of the 
longer expected wait until an acceptable worker arrives, and this cost falls with a fall in 
the value of output.  Employers who might not discriminate when the value of output is   19
high will do so when it is low. Thus the model captures the idea that discrimination will 
be more costly in a tighter labor market. A greater proportion of discriminating 
employers in the labor market lowers the bargaining power of type B workers relative to 
type A workers, increasing the wage gap. 
Another immediate impact of a drop in x, however, serves to increase the 
bargaining power of type B workers.  Other things equal, the fall in the value of workers’ 
product lowers the perceived value of both filled jobs and vacancies, causing some 
vacancies and jobs to be eliminated. But the model suggests that jobs and vacancies that 
are closed to type B workers are more likely to disappear. The existence of differing 
entrepreneurial ability means that there are marginal positions at every level of c, and 
these are the positions (filled or vacant) that disappear when a recession lowers x. There 
are, however, more infra-marginal positions at lower values of c. Therefore when x falls 
the proportion of positions that disappears is greater at higher values of c. This tends to 
lower the share of type-A only vacancies, raising the value of search for type B workers, 
and thus raising their bargaining power and wages relative to those of A workers.  
 Figure 2 depicts the nature of the equilibrium and illustrates the two initial and 
countervailing effects of a recession.  On the axes are ε and c, so that potential vacancies 
are distributed uniformly over the quadrant. The line labeled V(c) = 0 shows the dividing 
line between combinations of c and ε for which vacancies have positive utility (below the 
line) and those for which they have negative utility. Positive utility vacancies with c>c* 
hire only majority (A) workers; because V(c) declines in c up to c*, some AB (integrated) 
vacancies yield a higher surplus than any segregated vacancy.  The first impact of a 
recession is to lower the value of a vacancy (the shift from V(c) to V(c)’ in the figure) in   20
a way that lowers the level of c*, decreasing the share of positions potentially open to 
type B workers, and increasing the wage gap. However, as the figure also shows, the 
proportion of segregated positions that disappears is larger than the proportion of 
integrated positions that disappear, as a consequences of the fact that there are more 
infra-marginal positions at values of c below c*.   
As positions disappear, the rate at which workers arrive at employers rises, but the 
rate at which workers find new vacancies drops. As noted above, the higher arrival rate of 
workers at vacancies lowers the cost of discriminating, because a faster arrival of the next 
worker means less foregone output when a type B worker is turned away. This lowers the 
cutoff value of c*, which in turn lowers the value of search for type B workers relative to 
type A workers. A similar effect results from disproportionately more type A than type B 
workers losing jobs, raising the share of type A workers among the searchers and 
lowering the expected waiting time for the next type A applicant for firms who turn away 
type B workers. The lower arrival rate of job offers to workers lowers the value of search 
for both type A and type B workers, which lowers the wage of both types; but it lowers 
the value of search more for type A workers.  This decreases the wage gap, but is a rather 
subtle, non-intuitive effect, as are the impacts of the many of the subsequent equilibrating 
reactions of the model’s variables to the initial events set in motion by a fall in x. 
Although our model leaves open the question of whether discriminatory wage 
differentials are pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical, it does identify several distinct 
mechanisms through which business-cycle fluctuations could plausibly alter 
discriminatory wage differentials. These include cycle-induced changes in the costs and 
benefits of discrimination in hiring and changes in the mix of discriminators vs. non-  21
discriminators in the labor market caused by entry or exit. In addition, our argument 
about the process by which cyclical fluctuations in the value of output move wages 
towards new equilibrium values suggests that changes in discriminatory wage 
differentials associated with aggregate fluctuations will be due to the impact of these 
fluctuations on changes in the relative wages received by advantaged vs. disadvantaged 
workers who leave one job and search for another, as opposed to their impact on wages 
paid to workers continuing in the same job. Indeed, there is no mechanism in the model 
through which wages change for workers who do not change employers.  
V.  Job-Movers vs. Job Stayers 
 
  The short longitudinal structure of the CPS allows us to compare cyclical changes 
in gender/racial/ethnic wage differentials between job-movers and job-stayers, thus 
providing a test of the model’s implication that changes in unemployment affect wage 
gaps through their impact on the wage changes experienced by job changers.  The CPS 
does not identify employers, so we assume that workers who list the same small industry 
of employment in interviews in years t-1 and t are job-stayers, while those who list 
different industries are job-movers.  Given evidence of substantial reporting error in the 
self-classification of industry affiliation (Freeman, 1984), our test will thus underestimate 
the differences in effects between job-stayers and job-movers, since some job-stayers are 
mistakenly classified as job-movers. Finally, with losses of perhaps 1/3 of the CPS 
observations due to an inability to match across the pair of years, and other observations 
dropped because individuals enter or leave employment, the sample sizes here are smaller 
than those used in the cross-section analyses in Section III, but, of course, the same as in 
the analyses reflected in Table 4.   22
  To save space, in Table 7 we present only estimates of the interaction terms 
∂2ΔW/∂M∂U and their standard errors from the equations for job-stayers and –movers, 
along with what is essentially the triple difference [∂
2ΔW/∂M∂U]MOVER – 
[∂
2ΔW/∂M∂U]STAYER . The evidence in the table supports the model’s predictions. The 
relationship between labor-market tightness and the wage disadvantage facing women is 
greater in the sample of job-movers than in the sample of job-stayers. Among all 
Hispanics and Hispanic men the negative impact of the cycle is also more pronounced 
among job-movers; the opposite is true among Hispanic women, but none of these 
differences is statistically significant. Remembering from Table 1 that the wage 
disadvantage of African-Americans drops significantly when unemployment rises, the 
results here suggest that this is due to the behavior of wage changes among job-movers: 
Among African-Americans generally, and both men and women, the wage disadvantage 
becomes smaller among job-movers as unemployment rises, but varies insignificantly 
statistically among job-stayers. 
    Not all the differences between job-movers and job-stayers are statistically 
significant; but except for Hispanic females the mover-stayer differences demonstrate 
that the cyclicality that we observed in the cross section (rising wage disadvantages with 
unemployment among women and Hispanics, falling among African-Americans) occurs 
especially through the wage changes experienced by job-movers.  Remembering that our 
method of distinguishing job-movers and stayers necessarily blurs the distinction between 
them, these results seem fairly convincing.  They suggest that it is through wage-setting 
as new implicit contracts are entered into that the market effects of discrimination   23
become felt. Short-run increases in unemployment have less effect on wage differentials 
within jobs.    
VI. Conclusion and Implications 
  We have documented the existence of a relationship between discriminatory wage 
differentials and labor market tightness, as measured by either state unemployment rates 
or industry-based measures of shifts in labor demand. The evidence that a tighter labor 
market leads to a smaller discriminatory wage gap is strongest and most robust when 
comparing male and female wages, but the wage disadvantage facing Hispanics also 
seems to increase with unemployment. We find some evidence of a negative relationship 
between unemployment and the African-American-white wage gap.  
We stress that our findings reflect only changes in pure wage discrimination, as 
we have abstracted from changes in composition.  They say nothing about the differential 
incidence of job loss by gender, ethnicity or race as unemployment rises. However, the 
relationships that we uncover do not seem to be due to changes in the characteristics, 
either observable or unobservable, of employed workers that are associated with changes 
in unemployment rates.   
We develop a search-theoretic model of wage discrimination driven by employer 
preferences to explore possible causes for these findings. In the model, the cost to the 
employer of discriminating rises with the tightness of the labor market, which lowers the 
proportion of discriminators in the market; but recession leads to disproportionately 
greater exit by discriminating firms, so that the net effect on the amount of discrimination 
in the labor market and the tightness of the labor market is ambiguous.    24
In the search model, changes in discriminatory wage differences must come 
through the wage changes experienced by workers who change jobs, as it includes no 
mechanism through which employers change the wages paid to continuing employees. 
We do find that the relationship between changes in the unemployment rate and changes 
in discriminatory wage differentials is stronger in samples of workers who did change 
jobs than in samples of job-stayers. “Discriminatory” wage disadvantages, rising with 
unemployment among women and Hispanics, falling among African-Americans, are 
observed disproportionally in the wage changes experienced by job-movers.  The next 
step in re-opening this long-neglected area of study might be to use more detailed sets of 
data to infer the differential roles of the mechanisms indicated in our model that generate 
cyclical changes in pure wage discrimination and infer why the net effects differ among 
the groups we have studied.  
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Table 1. Coefficient Estimates Describing ln(Usual Weekly Earnings), CPS-MORG, 1979-
2009, All Workers* 
 
Coefficient  Female    Hispanic Hispanic Hispanic   Black  Black  Black
(std error)       Male Female    Male  Female
 
 
M  -0.0653    -0.1648 -0.1772 -0.1444 -0.1246  -0.158  -0.1002
 (0.0016)    (0.0032)  (0.0044)  (0.0047)  (0.0026) (0.0040)  (0.0034) 
                
U**  0.2526    -0.0776 -0.2406 0.0814 -0.1894  -0.3751  -0.0302
  (0.0263)  (0.0235)  (0.0333)  (0.0325)  (0.0238) (0.0337)  (0.0330) 
                
MxU  -0.8839    -0.1378 -0.3902 0.1183 0.2814  0.1613  0.5411
  (0.0237)  (0.0510)  (0.0688)  (0.0753)  (0.0396) (0.0603)  (0.0514) 
                
Adj. R
2  0.6811    0.6839 0.6368 0.7012 0.6824  0.6350  0.7001
                
N  5220568    5220568 2697981 2522587 5220568  2697981 2522587
            
Average effect  -0.1183    -0.1731 -0.2006 -0.1433  -0.1221 -0.1566 -0.0953 
 of M (log points)             
 
*Each equation includes a vector of indicators of educational attainment, quadratics in usual hours and potential  
 experience, and indicators of marital status, metropolitan location, veteran status and private/public. The equations  
 in Columns 1,2 and 5 also include an interaction of gender and marital status, and those in Columns 2 and 5 include  
 a main effect of gender. Each equation also includes state and year fixed effects.       
 
**Measured as a fraction here and in subsequent tables.    
Table 2. Coefficient Estimates Describing ln(Usual Weekly Earnings), CPS-MORG, 1979-2009, 
Workers with <= 5 Years of Experience and <16 Years of Schooling* 
 
Coefficient  Female    Hispanic Hispanic Hispanic Black  Black  Black
(std error)       Male Female   Male  Female
 
M  -0.0528    -0.0652 -0.0682 -0.0608 -0.0551  -0.0610 -0.0450
  (0.0033)   (0.0068)  (0.0095)  (0.0097)  (0.0607)  (0.0089) (0.0082) 
                
U  -0.8412    -1.0001 -1.1176 -0.7974 -1.0603  -1.2371 -0.859
  (0.0538)   (0.0481)  (0.0688)  (0.0668)  (0.0486) (0.0693) (0.0674) 
                
MxU  -0.4274    0.0387 -0.0975 0.1855 0.0304  -0.2161 0.2879
  (0.0493)   (0.1064)  (0.1479)  (0.1516)  (0.0912) (0.1345) (0.1230) 
                
Adj. R
2  0.7720    0.7724 0.7633 0.7763 0.7724  0.7632 0.7762
                
N  753727    753727 378624 375103 753727  378624 375103
   
 
*Same variables as in Table 1. State and year fixed effects in each equation.   
Table 3. Coefficient Estimates Describing ln(Usual Weekly Earnings), CPS-MORG, Sub-
periods 1980-1992, 1993-2009, All Workers* 
 
Coefficient  Female    Hispanic Hispanic Hispanic   Black  Black  Black
(std error)      Male Female   Male  Female
 
       1980-1992       
                
M  -0.0935    -0.1581 -0.1940 -0.1123 -0.1165  -0.1474  -0.0931
  (0.0024)  (0.0063)  (0.0085)  (0.0091)  (0.0038) (0.0057) (0.0049) 
                
U  1.3084    1.0601 0.9148 1.2562 1.0322  0.8990  1.2006
  (0.0255)  (0.0304)  (0.0290)  (0.0280)  (0.0208) (0.0294) (0.0288) 
                
MxU  -0.5639    -0.3261 -0.4059 -0.2323 0.0945  -0.0930  0.3744
  (0.0302)  (0.0874)  (0.1181)  (0.1271)  (0.0502) (0.0757) (0.0653) 
                
Adj. R
2  0.6864    0.6889 0.6278 0.7011 0.6879  0.6263  0.7005
                
N  2514889    2514889 1331140 1183749 2514889  1331140 1183749
                
                
       1993-2009       
                
M  -0.1391    -0.1211 -0.1406 -0.0999 -0.1108  -0.1571  -0.0755
  (0.0026)  (0.0040)  (0.0054)  (0.0059)  (0.0011) (0.0067) (0.0054) 
                
U  -0.0628    -0.3563 -0.4569 -0.2531 -0.4472  -0.5651  -0.3185
  (0.0351)  (0.0276)  (0.0398)  (0.0381)  (0.0273) (0.0386) (0.0385) 
                
MxU  0.4325    -0.4624 -0.5050 -0.3575 0.1949  0.1406  0.1831
  (0.0452)  (0.0690)  (0.0938)  (0.1013)  (0.0764) (0.1212) (0.0964) 
                
Adj. R
2  0.6189    0.6216 0.5833 0.6263 0.6204  0.5823  0.6253
                
N  2705679    2705679 1366841 1338838 2705679  1366841 1338838
 
*Same variables as in Table 1. State and year fixed effects in each equation.   
Table 4. Coefficient Estimates Describing Δln(Usual Weekly Earnings), CPS-MORG, 1980-
2009 and Sub-periods 1980-1992, 1993-2009, All Workers, Based on Longitudinal Data* 
              
Coefficient  Female    Hispanic Hispanic Hispanic Black  Black  Black
(std error)       Male Female   Male  Female
 
       1980-2009       
                
U  0.2208    0.0840 0.1251 0.0514 0.0270  0.0645  -0.0214
  (0.0558)  (0.0417)  (0.0584)  (0.0594)  (0.0420) (0.0582) (0.0604) 
                
MxU  -0.4044    -0.5567 -0.6829 -0.4979 0.0370  -0.1307 0.2615
  (0.0799)  (0.1449)  (0.1948)  (0.2153)  (0.1375) (0.2059) (0.1854) 
                
Adj. R
2  0.2989    0.2989 0.2460 0.3523 0.2989  0.2460  0.3523
                
N  1824705    1824705 948100 876605 1824705  948100  876605
                
       1980-1992       
               
U  0.4196    0.3469 0.3381 0.3504 0.2934  0.2808  0.2937
  (0.0581)  (0.0432)  (0.0599)  (0.0618)  (0.0441) (0.0605) (0.0640) 
                
MxU  -0.2593    -0.8511 -0.8824 -0.8550 0.1068  0.1010  0.1625
  (0.0834)  (0.1979)  (0.2624)  (0.2990)  (0.1473) (0.2210) (0.1951) 
                
Adj. R
2  0.3896    0.3896 0.3173 0.4651 0.3896  0.3173  0.4651
                
N  839707    839707 451279 388428 839707  451279  388428
                
       1993-2009       
                
U  0.4642    0.4125 0.4064 0.4044 0.3685  0.3575  0.3624
  (0.0590)  (0.0437)  (0.0606)  (0.0627)  (0.0448) (0.0614) (0.0650) 
                
MxU  -0.1693    -0.4925 -0.4810 -0.5190 0.2062  0.2699  0.1778
  (0.0849)  (0.2070)  (0.2742)  (0.3132)  (0.1495) (0.2238) (0.1982) 
                
Adj. R
2  0.3898    0.3898 0.3163 0.4671 0.3898  0.3163  0.4671
                
N  767463    767463 414055 353408 767463  414055  353408
 
*Also includes potential experience and current and past year’s usual weekly hours, and year fixed effects. 
   
Table 5.  CPS MORG 1979-2009, All Workers, Accounting for Industry Cyclicality (Trimmed Estimates)* 
Coefficient Female  Hispanic Hispanic  Hispanic  Black Black  Black 
(std error)  Male Female  Male Female 
M -0.0681  -0.1768 -0.1893  -0.1550  -0.1239 -0.1597  -0.0970 
(0.0017) (0.0033)  (0.0044)  (0.0048) (0.0027)  (0.0040)  (0.0035) 
U 0.2941  -0.0070 -0.1769 0.1387  -0.1067 -0.2957  0.0373 
(0.0259) (0.0232)  (0.0325)  (0.0328) (0.0235)  (0.0329)  (0.0333) 
MxU -0.8036  0.0264  -0.2140  0.2362  0.2904  0.2009  0.5069 
(0.0236) (0.0513)  (0.0691)  (0.0760) (0.0400)  (0.0601)  (0.0520) 
ΔH 0.0877  ￿.0671 0.0415 0.0751  0.1261 0.1005  0.1390 
(0.0112) (0.0091)  (0.0118)  (0.0142) (0.0090)  (0.0119)  (0.0147) 
ΔH*U -2.421  -2.112 -2.494  -0.880  -2.548 -2.993  -1.250 
(0.149) (0.120)  (0.154)  (0.190) ￿(0.123)  (0.157) (0.097) 
  
ΔH*M 0.0223  0.4455 0.5434  0.3760  -0.0943 -0.0944  -0.1197 
(0.0167) (0.0355)  (0.0454)  (0.0563) (0.0284)  (0.0398)  (0.0405) 
     
ΔH*M*U 0.751 -3.684 -5.708  -2.276  1.139 1.141  0.750 
(0.229) ￿(0.516)  ￿(0.652)  (0.823)  (0.382)  (0.525) (0.550) 
Adj. R
2 0.6816  0.6845 0.6418  0.6968  0.6829 0.6398  0.6956 
5044318 5044318 2599255 2445063 5044318  2599255 2445063 
          
∂
2W/∂M∂ΔH  0.0674   0.2243  0.2007  0.2394  -0.0259  -0.0259  -0.0747 
          
*Includes state and year fixed effects, and the same variables as in Table 1.  Trimmed to exclude observations 









Table 6. Estimates of the Effect of a One-Standard-Deviation Increase in Beauty on Male 
Attorneys’ ln(Earnings), Graduates 1972-77 and 1982-87* 
 
 
Cohort          Earnings Effect 
Year 1   Year 5 
 
1972-77 Graduates   0.0167    0.0431 
 (N = 778)   (0.0099)   (0.0114) 
 
 
1982-87 Graduates   0.0053    0.0068 
 (N = 789)   (0).0116)    (0.0104) 
 
*Based on Biddle and Hamermesh (1998, Table 3).  The estimates are adjusted for a wide variety of control 
variables. 




Table 7.  Coefficient Estimates Describing Δln(Usual Weekly Earnings), CPS-MORG, 1980-
2009, Distinguishing Job-Movers from Job-Stayers* 
∂
2ΔW/∂M∂U Female  Hispanic Hispanic Hispanic Black Black Black 
(std error)   Male Female  Male Female
               
Movers  -0.7436  -0.6266 -0.8729 -0.0474  0.2560 0.0163 0.6588 
(0.1453)  (0.2419) (0.3272) (0.3510)  (0.2382)  (0.3543)  (0.3200)
Stayers  -0.1206  -0.4782 -0.5484 -0.4192  -0.1145 -0.2753 0.0296 
(0.0888)  (0.1699) (0.2229) (0.2632) (0.1592)  (0.2291)  (0.2205) 
               
Movers -Stayers  -0.6230  -0.1484 -0.3245 0.3718   0.3704  0.2916  0.6292 
(0.1703)  (0.2956) (0.3959) (0.4387)  (0.2865)  (0.4219) (0.3886) 
 
                
 
    *Same variables as in Table 4.  
 
 












Figure 2.  Job Openings and Employers’ Tastes for Discrimination 
 